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There is a popular image of Taiwan as a close
approximation to a free market economy. Indeed it is
often held up as living proof that the basic prescription
of neoclassical economics is sound not only for
advanced industrial countries but also for countries en
roule to that status. Private initiative is always
preferred to public, the state is kept firmly in its place.
The chief characteristic, and the chief glory of this
arrangement is the absence of any directional thrust
imposed by the authority of government. Rather,
market forces produce the important economic
decisions, while the government merely registers them.
Industrialisation proceeds by virtue of the sum of the
autonomous decisions made by each producer.
More precisely, the argument for Taiwan is that the
government did meddle in the economy during the
1950s imposing all the familiar battery of controls
and regulations which accompany a strategy of
'import substitution'. Since the late l950s it has been
progressively withdrawing, progressively widening the
room for untrammeled market forces. And progressive
liberalisation has gone hand in hand with rapid
economic progress. It is above all the throwing open of
the economy to international markets in the early
1960s which set in motion the relentless drive for
efficiency in resource allocation which in turn
produced rapid growth. Other countries are advised to
learn the same lesson.
Such is the economic legend. It is by no means wholly
false. And it is certainly the case that the
overwhelming majority of Taiwan's academic and
government economists since the 1960s have believed
in the virtues of the freely functioning market as an
article of faith as well as of rhetoric. Yet it is not fully
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consistent with the way the government has in practice
behaved.
The government has adopted over a long period of
time a much more aggressive set of industrial policies
than free trading principles would justify. It has been
anticipating, rather than simply reacting to, changes in
Taiwan's international competitive position. And it
has been selecting between industries and specific
products in giving substantial incentives.
* * *
Take the anticipation point first. The usual
interpretation says that the push into heavy and
chemical industries dates from the early 1970s, after
and in response to rising real wages, competition from
other NICs, and rising protectionist barriers in export
markets. In the words of Samuel Ho, a leading expert
on Taiwan's development:
With protectionist sentiments rising in the
developed countries, continued rapid expansion of
the light manufactured exports on which Korea's
and Taiwan's industrial growth had been based
appeared problematic. Rising wages in Korea and
Taiwan also suggested that their comparative
advantage was shifting away from the semi-skilled,
labour-intensive industries that grew so rapidly in
the l960s. To policy-makers in both countries,
these changes in external and internal conditions
suggested a need to restructure the industrial
sector.
Accordingly:
In both Korea and Taiwan, the economic plans
that emerged in the mid-1970s (Taiwan's Seventh
Plan for 1976-81 .
.
.) reflected these concerns.
Planners advocated a move away from the labour-
intensive industries . . . This new direction of
industrialisation [towards heavy and chemical, as
well as technology-intensive industries] was
mapped out in the mid-1970s, shortly after the first
oil crisis . . . [Ho 1981; 1,179-81].
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This is the 'reactive' view of how it happened. In fact,
however, the move into heavy and chemical industries
was planned long before the early 1970s. The 1965-68
Plan is emphatic that:
For further development, stress must be laid on
basic heavy industries (such as chemical wood
pulp, petrochemical intermediates, and large-scale
integrated steel production) instead of end product
manufacturing or processing. Industrial develop-
ment in the long run must be centred on export
products that have high income elasticity and low
transportation costs. And around these products
there should be development of both forward and
backward industries, so that both specialisation
and complementarity may be achieved in the
interest of Taiwan's economy.
If this is done:
We shall then be able to meet the changing
situation in the world market brought about by the
rapid industrial progress of the emerging nations
and the growing sophistication of the industries of
the developed countries [Government of Republic
of China 1965:122, 124].
These arguments were formulated in 1962-64, several
years before the end of labour surplus (conventionally
put at 1968-70), still longer before protectionist
barriers began to rise, and more than 11 years before
the Plan to which Ho attributes the first expression of
restructuring concerns.
The first ha/f of the 1960s saw the rapid establishment
of a petrochemical industry on the island; by 1980
Taiwan was the fourth biggest producer of synthetic
fibres in the world. The government took the leading
role in promoting the steel and shipbuilding
industries, from the early l960s onwards. The first
nuclear reactor was started in 1968, and came on
stream in 1976 in time to help the country recover from
the first oil shock and weather the second. The
government established a number of industrial
research and service organisations to promote
technological and managerial upgrading in specific
sectors; such as the Metal Industries Development
Centre, established in 1963 to demonstrate improved
production and quality control methods and to
provide management training courses; and the China
Data Processing Centre, established to push the
introduction of computers in Taiwanese industries, in
1965. Other government sponsored and guided
research and service organisations were established
for chemicals, mining, energy, glass, textiles and food
processing. All this activity was part of the foundation
for what the engineers of the Industrial Development
Bureau unabashedly call 'the second era of import
substitution industrial development' [1982:1], which
they already anticipated during the 1960s even as the
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export of labour-intensive manufactures boomed all
around them.
What methods have been used to pursue the strategy
of secondary import substitution and new export
promotion? In particular, how much selection have
government officials made between industries and
specific products; and how much discretion have they
exercised on a case-by-case basis? It needs to be
recalled that of all the prescriptions of neoclassical
economics, that which says that government officials
should not attempt to exercise selective and
discretionary judgement on such matters is one of the
sternest.
Take first the trade regime. For all the characterisation
of Taiwan as a free trade economy, the government
has not allowed the use of foreign exchange, the
composition of imports, to be decided by domestic
demand in relation to prices set outside Taiwan. It has
influenced the volume and composition of imports by
a combination of very selective controls on trade, both
(non-discretionary) tariffs and (discretionary) quanti-
tative controls. It must be stressed that the reason for
the elaborate apparatus of trade management is not to
save scarce foreign exchange. Taiwan is in the unusual
position of having run balance of payments surpluses
in most years since 1970, and the foreign exchange gap
has not been a serious preoccupation of the planners
since the late 1960s (in sharp contrast to South Korea).
The main objective has been to build up technological
and supply capability within Taiwan, secondly to use
trade as a substitute for diplomatic relations now that
the country has been diplomatically isolated by
Mainland China, and thirdly to raise government
revenue (nearly a quarter of total taxes came from
tariffs in the late 1970s).
Government officials are required to exercise a high
degree of selectivity in setting tariff rates. The tariff
regime is extremely differentiated by product, with
tariffs ranging from zero to well over 100 per cent. It is
quite inconsistent with the two-tier structure recently
recommended by some neoclassical theorists for
developing countries; a 10-15 per cent unitirm rate of
effective protection for all manufacturing activities
other than the infant industries, which should get a
uniform rate no more than double the normal rate
[eg Balassa 1975]. Published tariffs are not an accurate
guide to the rates a potential importer must pay; for
the basis of import valuation for tariff purposes is the
cif price plus 10 per cent (down from 15 per cent prior
to 1983, and 20 per cent before 1979) pIus one or two
other charges. The average ad valorem tariff on
dutiable imports in 1977 was about 20 per cent.
Quantitative import controls provide a more subtle
and flexible instrument than tariffs. For the most
understandable of reasons the government is anxious
not to be seen to be doing anything which might
provide a pretext for other countries (notably the
United States) to put up barriers to its exports; and
takes great care to keep the mechanisms of
quantitative import control out of sight. The public
classification of imports into 'prohibited', 'controlled'
and 'permissible' does not capture the scope of the
system, for many items on the 'permissible' list are in
fact not freely importable [Westphal 1978]. To cut a
long story short, a would-be importer of steel and
other basic metals, petrochemicals, chemicals, some
specialised glass, some machinery and components (eg
some machine tools, forklift trucks, bearings),
amongst other items, is likely to find his application
for a licence (required for all imports and exports)
refused unless he can establish that the domestic
supplier cannot meet his terms, even though these
items may appear in the 'permissible' list. On top of
restrictions by product, there are restrictions on who
can import (traders can only get import licences if they
meet certain minimum asset and export requirements,
some items can only be imported by end users and/or
by government agencies - so that they rather than
The evening rush hour of Taivanese steelworkers: Chino Steel Complex, Kaohsiung.
traders get the windfalls); and restrictions on where
the imports can come from. The latter are often aimed
against Japan. More subtle restrictions on sources
may also be used to keep out products competitive
with US imports, because of American pressure on
Taiwan to reduce the trade surplus with the US. And if
wider foreign policy objectives require, almost any
restriction can be set aside; on imports of meat from
Latin America, for example, which though strictly
prohibited for health reasons, nevertheless are
sometimes (secretly) allowed in to help secure
Taiwan's growing interests in that region.
What is the import position of exporters? In the
neoclassical interpretation the most important reason
for Taiwan's boom in manufactured exports (after the
availability of cheap labour) is that exporters faced a
virtual free trade regime: they could buy inputs for
exports at world market prices, and hence have not
had a net incentive to sell on the domestic market
rather than on the international market (unlike in the
textbook import-substituting trade regime). In what
follows I ignore the export processing zones, which
have not been very important in Taiwan's total
exports.
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It is true that exporters pay no tariff duty on
intermediates used for export production. However
some very important intermediates are no! freely
importable, because they are subject to the mechanism
of import control just described. In principle, items
can only be put on the list subject to this control if the
price of the domestic substitute is equal to the cif price
of imports when the imports are to be used for export
production, or the cif price plus all tariffs and other
charges when the imports are to be used for domestic
market production. In practice there is scope for
negotiation in favour of the domestic producer.
As for capital goods, exporters do have to pay duty
unless they are concerned with products which appear
on a list of specific items to be encouraged (cg high
voltage insulation tape with working tolerance of
6.6 kv or more), and unless a domestic substitute for
the capital good is not available (again there is room
for negotiation on what constitutes a substitute). And
a variety of capital goods are subject to quantitative
import controls, even if they are to be used for export
production. Exporters are, however, exempt from
indirect taxes on input purchases. They have also in
the past been given an incentive through the
specification of side-conditions on the lists of items to
be given fiscal incentives (see below), which said that
the incentive would only be given ifa certain minimum
share of the output was exported.
The fact that exporters have to pay duty on many
capital goods (typically of 20+ per cent in the late
1970s) and cannot freely import some very important
intermediates as well as some capital goods, must
qualify the proposition that exports have faced a free
trade regime. The government has certainly allowed
the pressures of the international market to bear down
on the domestic economy, by using international
prices to discipline the price-setting of domestic
producers protected by quantitative restrictions on
imports - an important difference with the textbook
case of import substitution. But whereas small
differences between domestic and import prices for the
same item are conventionally taken to mean little
effective protection for domestic producers, in fact
domestic buyers of capital and intermediate goods do
not face neutral incentives as between buying abroad
or domestically. By means of quantitative restrictions,
even exporters may not have a free choice or neutral
incentives. This, in a word, is how the Taiwanese
Government has attempted both to expose the
economy to the discipline of the international market
and to build up domestic capability in selected capital
and intermediate goods industries.
If neoclassical theory is to advance beyond the crude
dichotomy of import substitution versus export
promotion, the Taiwanese experience of trade
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management would repay open-minded study [see
Scott 1979; Little 1979]. There is much more to say
about that experience. But let us pass to the second
main instrument of industrial policy.
What is unusual about Taiwan's fisca/ incentives is not
their content. They comprise the familiar tax holiday
(five years), accelerated depreciation, investment tax
credits, a reduced rate of business income tax for
production of certain items. What is unusual is the
degree of selection between products which is entailed
in the specification of eligible items: in heavy electrical
machinery, for example, six types of product are
identified as eligible for a reduction in business income
tax from 251022 per cent; one of which is transformers
- but not all transformers, only those of 154 kv class
or above; in electronics, not any semi-conductor
devices, but only those equipped with diffusion
facilities orion implantation facilities. Over the 1970s,
as technology frontiers within Taiwan have been
pushed outwards, the definition of products eligible
for incentives has been made more stringent (by higher
performance standards, for example), so as to keep the
incentives pushing on the frontiers. Reading the lists of
items eligible for various fiscal incentives, one has the
distinct impression that the Taiwanese planners know
exactly where they want the economy to go to. The
compilation of the lists involves them in a considerable
exercise ofjudgement about which products should be
promoted.
As for credit controls, since the 1950s these have been
less important in Taiwan than in many other
countries, including Korea and France. The banking
system is almost wholly government owned, and the
government sets interest rates. Some preferential
financing for exports has been available, but much
less, and at a lower margin of preference, than in
Korea over the l970s. To help steer resources to
priority sectors the government has established a
variety of special funds for specific purposes; but has
not set credit allocation targets for commercial bank
lending. On the whole the government has used credit
to a lesser extent than one might suppose from
government ownership of the banks, or from the
elaborateness of the trade and fiscal incentives.
Direct foreign investment has been actively solicited,
not only to provide new markets and to bring new
technology to the island but also to have a trip-wire of
important US companies in case China decides to
invade. But again, while Taiwan has been less selective
about foreign investment than Korea, it has still been
quite selective; and increasingly so as labour has
become scarcer and as Taiwanese firms have acquired
technological capacity in many sectors. Government
officials exercise a considerable amount of discretion
as to what incentives (beyond the standard package) a
foreign firm is offered and what obligations are
imposed on it (how much of its production has to be
exported, how much of its inputs have to be locally
made, etc). And the government has been active in
reducing the enclave nature of foreign firms by
performing a matchmaking function - scrutinising
the flow of imports going to foreign firms, seeing
which could feasibly be produced in Taiwan,
encouraging local suppliers (always with the lever of
import controls in the background), and doing the
same with exports to see what could be further
processed in Taiwan.
For complex reasons which I shall not go into, the
state of Taiwan has exerted less direct discretionary
influence over private domestic firms than in Japan,
South Korea or Singapore; but has offset this
weakness with a larger public enterprise sector. The
whole of the public sector (government and public
enterprises) is substantially bigger than in such
putatively more 'socialist' countries as India and
Tanzania, to say nothing of Japan and the United
States. Public sector final demand (government
consumption, government capital formation, public
enterprise gross capital formation) as a share of GDP
was 30 per cent in Taiwan over 1975-78, only 20 per
cent in India, 25 per cent in Tanzania, 19 per cent in
Japan and 21 per cent in the United States [Pathirane
and Blades 1982]. As for public enterprises specifically,
their share in total fixed capital formation is about the
same as in India (33 per cent in 1978-80), significantly
more than in South Korea (23 per cent). Individual
public enterprises are typically amongst the largest
firms in their respective sectors. In 1980, the six biggest
industrial public enterprises had sales equal to the 50
biggest private industrial concerns. The public
enterprises cover the whole range of sectors, but are
concentrated on the commanding heights to which
European socialists wistfully aspire: petroleum and
petrochemicals, fertiliser, steel and other basic metals,
shipbuilding, and heavy machinery (in addition to the
standard electricity, gas, water, railway and telephone
utilities). If there is less pushing and prodding of
private firms in Taiwan than in the other dirigist NICs,
it is partly because the state has this large public
enterprise sector as an instrument of selective and
discretionary intervention. The main large lump
import-substituting projects of the 1970s - in
petrochemicals, steel and other basic metals, electric
power and shipbuilding - were carried out by public
enterprises. They have access to various kinds of
preferential investment financing, notably direct
disbursement from the government budget and access
to overseas loans. If one asks, then, from where the
major new industries of the 1970s got their finance and
on what terms, the answer is that a large part of the
new industries were in public enterprise hands and got
finance on preferential terms. This qualifies the earlier
point about the overall unimportance of selective and
discretionary allocation of credit.
The Taiwanese Government has imparted a directional
thrust to the economy by means of trade controls,
fiscal incentives, some credit incentives and disin-
centives, controls over direct foreign investment, and
state-owned enterprises in key sectors. These several
policies have a high degree of coherence, in the sense
that their impact is cumulative: the activities which
receive help via trade controls also get fiscal incentives
and promotional assistance, for example. The policies
require government officials to exercise a good deal of
selection of products to encourage; but with the
exception of quantitative import controls, are
relatively non-discretionary with respect to private
domestic firms. They aim to structure the incentive
environment of private firms in such a way that the
autonomous profit-seeking of private firms will lead
them to behave in ways which aggregate up to national
goals.
On the other hand, relatively little use has been made
since the early 1960s of direct negative controls on
production or investment. Whereas many other
Governments have tried to bolster leaky trade
controls with direct controls on production in order to
block off imports to non-priority sectors, the
Taiwanese Government has not done so. The relative
absence of direct negative controls reflects an
important characteristic of the macroeconomic
environment: the pricing of the basic factors of
production at levels close to scarcity value. The
exchange rate has not been much overvalued; inflation
has been kept low; interest rates have been kept high
(by international standards); public enterprises have
not in general been stibsidised. With the basic factor
prices at close to equilibrium levels, less rationing by
administrative means is needed, and more reliance can
be placed on structuring incentives. In Korea, by
contrast, factor prices have been less close to scarcity
values, and the government has used more positive
and negative discretionary controls [Jones and
SaKong 1980J.
The overall price environment of course is just what
the neoclassical interpretation concentrates on, to the
exclusion of almost everything else. That interpretation
is not so much wrong as misleadingly partial. By
implying that 'getting the prices right' (putting
domestic prices into line with international prices) was
the almost sufficient condition of Taiwan's success, it
underplays the conditions which allowed Taiwan to
respond with high short-run supply elasticities -
which include the long experience under the 'hard',
growth-oriented colonial state imposed by the
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Japanese (1895-1945), the build-up of industrial
capacity during the import-substituting regime of the
1950s, and a certain kind of disciplined political
regime. This interpretation occludes the extent to
which government officials have continued to exercise
foresight on Taiwan's changing international position,
and selectivity with respect to specific industrial
products. Without these other factors, getting the
prices right may have had no more effect than pushing
on a piece of string. Moreover, prices themselves have
a meaning in a guided market economy like Taiwan's
different from that in neoclassical theory. For the
government's modifications of the competitive
process changes the prices to which enterprises
respond. And not all of an enterprise's decisions are
allowed to be determined by prices; a small number of
very important decisions may be decided, in the case of
selected types of firms or industries, by the
government (eg how much of its output a foreign firm
must export, what sectors a firm cannot expand into).
Taiwan's experience suggests that while government
officials anywhere can be obstructive of economic
progress, once they are geared to promoting
technological change they can facilitate industriali-
sation by exercising foresight in a way that the
ordinary businessman simply could not afford to
cultivate.
But how much impact have the policies really had? It is
always open to the doubters to say, echoing Jacques
Rueff on French planning, that the policies
contributed no more to Taiwan's industrialisation
than the cock's crow contributes to the dawn.
Taiwan's hundreds of professional economists have
shown conspicuously little interest in the question of
impact, preferring simply to believe that virtually all
interventions are contrary to nature and to be
deplored. Not unrelatedly, economists have had little
influence in Taiwanese industrial policy (beyond the
realm of monetary policy). The policies have been
designed by engineers, and engineers have been
responsible for formulating the lists of activities to be
encouraged.
The question of effectiveness is certainly very
complex. The above account does, however, put the
70
onus on the sceptics to show that the policies, for all
their interventionist intention, had only a negligible
role in one of the most successful industrialisations on
record. Until that is done, Taiwan cannot readily be
used to support the case that free trading principles,
and a government restricted to law and order,
infrastructure and macro balance, are always best.
Often best, maybe; but not always best, and the crucial
question is what makes the difference.
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